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COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) aims at the 
establishment of a currency union in 2025. To this purpose, a policy harmonization 
program and a set of convergence criteria have been set up. A number of projects to 
foster trade, economic and financial integration have also been launched. Using time-
series econometrics, this paper provides evidence on some of the dimensions involved 
by such a process. Some highlights are as follows. The monetary policy stance mildly 
converges across countries; fiscal stabilization is instead still problematic in several 
member states. In spite of a low level of intra-regional trade, the  economic 
fundamentals in a bulk of member states share a common stochastic trend; this 
suggests that shocks might be symmetric and hence business cycles synchronized. The 
implications is that countries might indeed benefit from deep forms of monetary 
integration. The distribution of income across countries in the region is highly 
unequal and there is no sign of convergence. In fact, the gap between poorer and 
richer countries appears to be widening. Against these results, some policy 
implications can be drawn concerning the design of transition towards monetary 
unity, mechanisms for self-financing of regional projects and compensation, removal 
of barriers to trade integration. 
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Regional integration is a recurrent item in the development agenda of African 
policymakers. Most countries indeed participate into Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) with the aim to achieve deep forms of integration, as for 
instance represented by a currency union. The entire project of a African Union has in 
these RECs its building blocs to realize continental political and economic 
institutions, including a common central bank. 
The potential benefits of economic integration are widely acknowledged in the 
literature. But so are its costs and potential drawbacks, especially when participating 
countries are on average poor and at significantly different stages of economic 
development. The desirability of deep integration in Africa, the way to achieve it and 
its possible effects are the key themes of an increasing body of research. Attention so 
far has been mostly focused on West Africa, where the whole process of integration is 
admittedly more advanced
1.  
The purpose of this paper is to expand the literature by turning attention also to 
what happens in Eastern and Southern Africa, and in particular in the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). This community is in fact an 
interesting case study: its programme of policy harmonization envisages a currency 
union among a large number of countries (covering 42.6% of total African surface 
and accounting for 44.6% of total population and 32% of total GDP) characterised by 
strong disparities in their economic and social background. Econometric evidence will 
be presented to shed light on different dimensions of the integration process: the 
degree of convergence of countries’ macroeconomic policy stance, the existence of 
optimal currency area requisites,  the evolving pattern of income inequalities.  
Two previous valuable contributions on integration in Eastern and Southern 
Africa need to be mentioned. Harvery et al. (2001) report on pre-requisites for 
monetary integration in COMESA, thus focusing on the aspect of macroeconomic 
convergence. Mkenda (2001) instead addresses the question of whether the East 
African Community (EAC) is an optimal currency area. Relative to them, the value 
added of this paper is to extend the scope of analysis by considering a broader set of 
issues (and in the case of Mekenda’s paper also a different, larger, sample of 
countries) and by applying various models for the econometric analysis of time-series 
data. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the recent 
history of COMESA and summarizes key economic and social trends. Section 3 looks 
at the degree of convergence of macroeconomic policy across member states. Section 
4 takes up the issue of whether COMESA is an optimal currency area. Section 5 
investigates the time pattern of income dispersion. Section 6 concludes. The data-set 
is described in Appendix 1. Tables are reproduced in Appendix 2. 
 
2.  Basic facts and economic trends in COMESA 
 
Macroeconomic integration is one of the core programs of COMESA since its 
creation in 1994. Before assessing progress and perspectives of this process it is worth 
reviewing its origins and the socio-economic framework within which it unfolds. 
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1 See for instance, Fielding and Shields (1999), Masson and Pattillo (2001a,b), Dore’ and Masson 
(2002).   
2.1 The Monetary and Fiscal Policies Harmonization Program of COMESA 
 
COMESA is the offspring of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which came into 
existence in 1982 to promote trade and factor mobility among its member states
2. A 
trade liberalization program was launched in 1984 to achieve the elimination of tariffs 
on a selected list of commodities within eight years. The deadline was subsequently 
postponed to 2000 to give countries more time to adjust their budgets to changes in 
the flow of tariff revenues 
3. In 1989 the decision was made to strengthen integration 
efforts and to establish a monetary union. To this purpose, in 1992, the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government adopted a Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
Harmonization Program. This was then endorsed by COMESA when it replaced PTA 
in 1994.  
The harmonization program envisages a gradual evolution towards full monetary 
integration. The transition is articulated in four stages, with a common currency to be 
issued in 2025. Before that, countries would first strengthen co-operation on 
macroeconomic policies (stage 1), introduce limited currency convertibility and set up 
an informal exchange rate union (stage 2), and finally participate into a formal system 
of fixed exchange rates with economic policies harmonized by a common monetary 
institution (stage 3). In 1995, the implementation of the program was reviewed and a 
set of convergence criteria for macroeconomic policy variables were introduced to 
guide harmonization (see COMESA, 1995 and Harvey et al. 2001).  
Ancillary to the harmonization of macroeconomic policies are a number of 
initiatives in the field of financial and banking sector integration. These include the 
transformation of the Clearing House to facilitate regional payments and to deliver 
electronic financial services, the creation of regional financial institutions (such as the 
Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank and the COMESA 
Reinsurance Company), and preliminary steps in the realization of a joint system of 
banking supervisions and regulation through the Meetings of Bank Supervisors (for 
details see COMESA, 2003). 
 
2.2 Socio-economic trends in the  region 
 
Table 1 reports some basic socio-economic indicators for COMESA countries, 
various African RECs, and non-African aggregates. The regional averages show that 
COMESA is catching up with the rest of Africa, even though the gap with other non-
African developing regions remains wide. However, at individual country level, 
trends are highly heterogeneous and eleven COMESA member states exhibit growth 
rates lower than the African average. Not surprisingly, the two indicators of human 
development (life expectancy at birth and child mortality) strongly correlate with 
income levels and, to a smaller extent, GDP growth.   
                                                 
2 As of December 2003, membership of COMESA is: Angola, Burundi, Comoros Islands, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
3 A Free Trade Area (FTA) has been effectively launched in October 2000. Originally, the FTA 
included: Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Burundi, Rwanda and Swaziland joined in 2003. The implementation of a common external tariff,  and 




INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Several factors contribute to the determination of such trends. One is certainly 
political instability and social unrest. Rwanda comes to mind as a clear example: the 
negative growth rates observed in the first half of the ‘90s (-4.4% annual growth of 
per-capita GDP, -3.85% annual growth of aggregate GDP) reversed since 1995 with 
the improvement in the socio-political context. A second important factor is the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. The pandemic is seriously eroding the social base of several 
countries. The increase in the HIV prevalence ratio explains the decrease in life 
expectancy in countries like Zimbabwe and Swaziland. The associated disruption of 
human capital then hampers future prospects for economic growth and human 
development. Finally, for most countries, negative trends result from the volatility of 
international agricultural prices and extreme climatic conditions. These also lead to 
growing external imbalances and debt sustainability problems.  
The expectation of member states is that macroeconomic integration can generate 
significant efficiency and dynamic gains and hence contribute to improving such 
trends. More generally, as widely discussed in ECA (2004), the whole process of 
regional integration and co-operation is now regarded as a pivotal component of a 
development strategy addressing issues of peace and security, health, poverty 
reduction, and macroeconomic stability. 
 
3.  The convergence of macroeconomic policy variables 
 
The process of macroeconomic integration in COMESA requires the 
harmonization of policies and hence the convergence of macroeconomic indicators 
across countries. This section presents some evidence from time-series data on this 
form of convergence. 
 
3.1  Cross-country convergence of macroeconomic indicators 
 
Preliminary evidence on the degree of convergence of policies can be obtained by 
comparing the levels of macroeconomic variables across member states to see 
whether their dispersion increases or decreases over time. To this purpose, Table 2 
reports for the period 1980-2002 basic summary statistics of eight key indicators. 
These are the variables targeted by the convergence criteria introduced in 1995 as a 
part of the policy harmonization program of COMESA. Data are averaged over sub-
periods, with the latest observation including the early 2000s, up to the latest available 
information (usually 2002). Convergence would be signalled by a decreasing standard 
deviation as well as a lower percent of countries falling in the tails of the distribution 
(last two columns of the table).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
With the exception of domestic credit, for all variables the standard deviation 
evolves non-linearly over time. This makes it particularly difficult to identify a 
common general pattern of convergence/divergence. For six variables, standard 
deviation in early ‘2000s is smaller than in the first half of the ‘80s. However, for only 
three variables, the 2000s value is the lowest ever. For another two, standard deviation 
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 exhibits a recent tendency to increase after hitting the minimum in the period 1995-
99. All in all, the aggregate picture is quite mixed. 
Focusing on individual variables, a few interesting experiences emerge. Starting 
with monetary indicators, inflation is one of the two variables whose standard 
deviation in 2000s is larger than in 1980-84. Yet, after the peak in 1985-89, dispersion 
has been significantly reduced throughout the ‘90s. The slight increase reported for 
the latest sub-period is mostly due to sporadic high inflation episodes in a few 
member states against a decreasing regional average. Indeed, in only four countries, 
mean inflation in 2000-02 is above 10% (Madagascar, Malawi, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe). Money growth data display a similar pattern, even though relative to 
inflation the extent of convergence in the ‘90s is milder and the increase in divergence 
in 2000s is stronger. The large number of countries falling in the tails of the 
distribution is a consequence of the fast decrease in the regional average. Finally, 
there is evidence of convergence in the degree of central bank financing of 
government deficit, which however remains on average high.
4 
Turning to fiscal indicators, the regional dispersion of fiscal deficit exhibits wide 
fluctuations around a moderately decreasing trend. Still, deficit levels remain 
generally high, in spite of the progress observed during the ‘90s, thus placing fiscal 
stabilization among top macroeconomic priorities for the region. To some extent, 
fiscal imbalances arise from difficulties in collecting revenues through the tax system. 
A limited economic base and inefficient tax administrations have forced countries to 
rely on taxes on international trade to raise a consistent share of their budget revenues. 
As the process of trade liberalization unfolds, progressing from early to late 
liberalization, such revenues will be reduced and reliance on domestic taxation ought 
to increase. For this reason, a target of 10% (to be risen to 15%) on the tax revenues to 
GDP ratio has been imposed. The data in the table show that taxes are fairly stable 
and above the target, while dispersion is low and on a decreasing trend. The persistent 
fiscal stabilization problems however suggest that a more ambitious threshold should 
be set to provide governments with incentives to reform the tax policy. 
The data also suggest that debt service ratios are generally converging towards 
more sustainable levels. Progress in this area has been facilitated by participation of 
several member states into the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. In 
fact, as projected by IMF, upon completion of the procedure, the average benefit for a 
country in the initiative can be quantified as a 50% reduction of debt service. It must 
also be stressed that the picture emerging from the table might be overoptimistic since 
the data on debt service only include paid debt. Unpaid debt however is likely to be 
large, at least for some countries (see Harvery et al. 2001).
5 
 
3.2   Time-series evidence on convergence of monetary variables 
 
                                                 
4 Consider that the target imposed by the harmonization program is that CB financing should be at most 
equal to 20% of previous year tax revenues. The level observed in 2000-02 is more than three times 
higher than such target. 
 
5 COMESA countries participating into HIPC are: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia. For a comprehensive discussion of debt 




 The time-series properties of macroeconomic data allow for an econometric test of 
convergence based on a simple first-order autoregressive process: 
 
(1)      t t t y y       1 1 0
 
where y is a macroeconomic variable observed at time t in a generic country,  is a 
white-noise, and the s are parameters to be estimated. When the null hypothesis is 
specified as  , then its rejection can be taken as evidence that the series is 
converging. Estimated model parameters can then be used to compute the value to 
which the series tends to converge and the speed of convergence. 
1 : 1 0   H
There are well-know econometric issues involved in the estimation of equation 
(1). First of all, statistical inference must be based on corrected standard errors, as the 
normal ones do not account for the distortion arising from having a lagged dependent 
variable on the right hand side (Dickey and Fuller, 1979 and 1981). Second, if the 
series includes a structural break, then model (1) is inadequate as it tends to be biased 
towards non-rejection of the null hypothesis. Indeed, the introduction of convergence 
criteria and the participation into a policy harmonization program could, and to some 
extent should, determine a sharp policy change and hence a structural break in the 
series. For this reason, the test of convergence will be based on the following 
expanded equation (see also Perron, 1990): 
 
(2)             t t t t D y D y y               ) ( 1 3 2 1 1 0
 
where D is a dummy variable taking value 1 in year  and in any subsequent year t > 
, and all the other variables and parameters are defined as in equation (1). The 
dummy variable accounts for the possibility that the behaviour of the series in terms 
of both intercept and slope is structurally different after . For the purpose of 
assessing convergence in COMESA it therefore makes sense to code the dummy as 1 
starting in 1994, when COMESA replaced the PTA (this dummy is referred to as 
D1994). An alternative coding assigns value 1 starting in 1995, when the policy 
harmonization was revised with the adoption of criteria (this dummy is referred to as 
D1995)
 6. The robustness of results to changes in the definition of D is discussed later. 
The estimation of equation (2) requires a sufficiently long string of observations 
on variable y to be available. For most of the countries in the sample, this is the case 
only for inflation and money growth. Fiscal data are instead available only annually 
and for a period of maximum 30 to 35 years. Therefore, the bulk of the analysis 
focuses on the two monetary variables. Results for the other variables, to be taken 
with great caution because of the limited sample size, are eventually available upon 
request from the author. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating equation (2) on quarterly data for 
inflation and monetary growth (results using annual data are qualitatively similar). For 
each country for which data are available, the table reports whether or not the series is 
converging and eventually to which value. The letter S indicates that the speed and/or 
the value of convergence are significantly affected by the dummy D. Estimates 
                                                 
6 As noted below, the dummy however does not allow to separate the effect of participation into 
COMESA from the effect of other events taking place in the same period or year. 
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 obtained using D1994 are not significantly different from those obtained using 
D1995. The table displays results using D1995. As a test of robustness, dummies 
taking value 1 starting in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 have also been used. They are 
generally much less significant than either D1994 or D1995. Similarly, pulse 
dummies for each individual year (since 1990) are significant only for a few countries 
and only for years 1994, 1995 and occasionally 1996. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In reading the table it is useful to keep in mind that single digit inflation and 
money growth in the range of 10% to 20% can be considered as the reference values 
targeted by the convergence criteria. Two critical features emerge. First, for several 
countries, the null hypothesis of no convergence cannot be rejected. Second, in the 
countries where the null can be rejected, series appear to converge to values that are 
consistent with the targets. A corollary to this latter observation is that for the 
countries with converging series, the estimated values of convergence fall in a rather 
small range. Hence, for those countries there is evidence of systematic regional 
convergence of monetary variables. 
 The evidence of convergence is stronger for money growth. In fact, all countries 
with convergent inflation also have convergent rates of money growth, whilst the 
opposite is not true. Some significant structural breaks are also detected in 1994 and 
1995. For some countries, however, it is difficult to disentangle between the impact of 
participation in COMESA and in its policy harmonization program from the impact of 
other socio-political and economic events taking place in those years. This is for 
instance the case of Rwanda, where the observed structural breaks are more likely to 
be associated with the end of the most violent phase of the ethnic war than with 
adhesion to the regional economic community.  
The caveats in applying the procedure to other macroeconomic variables have 
already been noted. Keeping them in mind, the general finding is that convergence is 
even milder than what observed for the two monetary variables. In no country fiscal 
deficit appears to converge in the long-run. Debt service converges in Ethiopia, 
Mauritius, Sudan and Swaziland, with evidence of structural breaks around mid-90s. 
Central bank financing of deficit is converging only in Kenya, and to a level which is 
projected to be about 2.5 times higher than the target value set by the COMESA 
criterion. Finally, total claims on government in percent of GDP show convergence in 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Rwanda, but only in this latter one the value to which the series 
converges is below 10%. 
 
3.3   Summary of evidence on convergence of macroeconomic variables 
 
There is evidence that some monetary variables are converging, both within and 
across countries, to levels which are consistent with the target set by the policy 
harmonization framework. This evidence however is not systematic and relates only 
to some countries. Yet, progress in stabilizing inflation must be acknowledged. For 
the other variables, evidence of convergence is weaker. In particular, while the cross-
national dispersion of deficit is on a decreasing pattern, fiscal stabilization and 




 4.  Is COMESA an optimal currency area ? 
 
The question of whether a given region is an optimum currency area has been 
posed several times, especially (but not exclusively) with respect to Europe. Two 
factors that have been pointed out as critical dimensions to optimality are intra-
regional trade and symmetry of shocks (De Grauwe, 2003). Evidence on those two 
factors is therefore investigated in this section. 
 
4.1.  The degree of trade integration among member states 
 
The evidence on intra-COMESA trade flows is summarised in Table 4. For each 
country the table reports trade with other COMESA members in percent of GDP 
(Column 1), in percent of trade with all African states (Column 2), and in percent of 
total international trade (Column 3). The information is given for two sub-periods: the 
‘80s and the ‘90s, including the early 2000s (data are normally available up to 2001 
for most countries). Summary statistics for COMESA and for other regions are also 
reported. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
It appears from the table that COMESA countries trade mostly with partners 
outside Africa. Intra-regional trade is small if compared against the standards of other 
communities of developing and emerging countries outside Africa. Over the past two 
decades, internal trade in the region increased by on average 1% of GDP (with more 
significant growth in countries like Djibouti, Malawi and Zambia), but intra-African 
trade increased by a greater proportion. As a result, the share of intra-regional trade on 
total intra-African trade considerably decreased. 
It has to be stressed that several other African RECs display patterns of trade 
similar to those of COMESA, even though intra-regional trade usually accounts for a 
greater share of total international trade of member states. Moreover, with the 
exception of the two CFA zones, this share has increased at a faster rate than what 
achieved by COMESA. In particular, the cumulative growth rate of intra-regional 
trade between the two sub-periods was 62% in ECOWAS and 88% in SADC, 
resulting in an increase of 22% and 66% respectively in the regional trade share of 
total trade. For COMESA the corresponding figures are 37% and 20%. 
The empirical literature on the determinants of trade provides indications on 
possible explanations for the low levels of regional trade in COMESA. Gravity 
equations show that bilateral trade flows between any two countries are positively 
affected by aggregate economic size, per-capita income levels, density and efficiency 
of infrastructures, participation into economic arrangements (such as free trade areas 
and currency unions). A negative effect can instead be traced back to geographical 
distance and to the levels of tariff and non-tariff barriers
7. Now, most COMESA 
countries are economically small and poor, separated by large distances and with 
inefficient infrastructures which reduce the degree of physical integration. Tariff 
barriers persist in spite of the implementation of the free trade area, whilst significant 
non-tariff barriers emerge from lack of harmonization of rules and payment systems 
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7 Among the many studies in this area, two that are particularly popular are Rose (2000) and Glick and 
Rose (2001). as well as from the high costs of transportation and telecommunication. Therefore, 
low regional trade integration should not come unexpected. 
One way to measure the trade performance of COMESA against structural 
determinants of trade is to compute predicted flows by fitting a gravity model and 
then compare them against actual flows. Column 4 of Table 4 summarizes the result 
of this exercise. The gap between actual intra-regional trade and intra-regional trade 
predicted from the gravity estimates of Glick and Rose (2001) is reported for each 
country 
8. The gap is almost always positive. This means that whilst internal trade in 
COMESA is low by international (and even African) standards, it is already higher 
than what the structural (economic and geographical) factors prevailing in the region 
would sustain. That is, regional trade can be expected to boost only endogenously 
with economic growth and further progress on physical, legal and macroeconomic 
integration. 
 
4.2.  Shock asymmetries and convergence of business cycles 
 
A number of methods have been proposed to measure econometrically the degree 
of shock asymmetry across countries in a cluster. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) 
and Korhonen and Fidrmuc (2001) apply the Blanchard-Quah decomposition to 
estimate supply and demand shocks from output and price data. Unfortunately, the 
data requirements involved by such a method are not met by several COMESA 
countries.  
A valuable alternative route makes use of the Generalized Purchasing Power 
Parity (G-PPP) hypothesis. G-PPP holds when the bilateral real exchange rates 
(RERs) between pairs of countries in a region are cointegrated. Following Enders and 
Hurn (1994), who first proposed the hypothesis, positive evidence of G-PPP can be 
interpreted as evidence that the economic fundamentals across countries share a 
common stochastic trend, and hence that shocks are symmetric. Therefore, the test of 
shocks convergence takes the form of a test of cointegration in the following 
equation:  
 
(3)        t t m m t t t r r r r            , 1 1 , 14 14 , 13 13 0 , 12 ...
 
where r1j,t denotes the RER between the reference country 1 and a generic country j in 
a cluster of m countries (j = 2, 3, ……, m), t denotes time,  is a stationary stochastic 
disturbance and s are the parameters. Because of its relatively accessible data 
requirement, this procedure is applied below to the group of COMESA countries 
9 
The first step is the construction of bilateral quarterly RER series for all 
COMESA member states. To this purpose, three different anchor countries are 
chosen, so that for each member state three different series are computed (clearly for 
the three anchors, one of the series is a sequence of ones). The three anchors are 
Egypt, Kenya and Zimbabwe. They have been chosen because of their economic size 
                                                 
8 Findings do not qualitatively change if other gravity estimates are used. The full set of results (also 
including those generated from a gravity equation estimated only on the sample of African countries) 
are available from the author upon request. 
 
9 See Hong Liang (1999) and Mkenda (2001) for an implementation of the procedure using different 
samples of developing economies.  
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  and extent of trade with COMESA partners. They are also commonly recognised as 
the centre of the three sub-regional groupings in which COMESA can be 
partitioned
10. Between the anchor country i and the generic country j, the RER is 
computed as the nominal bilateral exchange rate times the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) in i divided by CPI in j. Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Namibia, and 
Zambia are dropped from the sample because of lack of data. 
The analysis of cointegration obviously requires RERs to be non-stationary and 
integrated of the same order. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of 
stationariety yields the following results. When Egypt is the anchor, then the series 
integrated of order 1 (I(1)) are
11: Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Malawi and 
Uganda are instead stationary. When Kenya is the anchor all the series are I(1). When 
Zimbabwe is the reference, the I(1) series are: Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Uganda. Swaziland is I(2) whilst 
DRC and Madagascar are stationary. All of these results are robust to changes in the 
lag structure and in the specification of the ADF equation. The same results are 
obtained when the Phillips-Perron test of stationariety is used. 
Testing for cointegration is problematic when equation (3) includes too many 
endogenous variables. A rule of thumb that is sometimes used indicates in 10 their 
maximum acceptable number. Consequently, the Generalized-PPP method is first 
applied to sub-groups of countries within COMESA separately. Then, the test will be 
run for the entire group. In this case, however, some adjustments will be made to the 
sample in order to have at most 10 endogenous variables. Details on the composition 
of groups are provided as notes to Table 5. 
 The test of cointegration is performed through the Johansen Vector Autorgression 
(VAR) method. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no cointegration in 
equation (3). Therefore, rejection of the null means that the series are cointegrated and 
hence that there is evidence of shock convergence across countries. Table 5 
summarises the findings of the test. For each sub-group and group, the table reports 
the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic and the critical values at 5% and 1% confidence 
levels. The estimated number of cointegrating vectors is also reported in the last 
column of the table. Results have been generated assuming a liner deterministic trend 
in the data and one-two lags in the VAR equation. Sensitivity of results to those 
assumptions are discussed below. 
  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
For geographical sub-groups, the null hypothesis can be always rejected at 5% 
confidence levels, and in the case of the central sub-group also at 1% confidence 
level. However, these results are sensitive to the type of trend assumed and to the 
number of lags in the VAR. The sub-group of large countries includes the four 
economies with largest aggregate GDP. The evidence on the existence of at least one 
                                                 
10 Geographical groups are identified as follows (see for instance Harvey et al. 2001). 
North:  Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan;  
Centre: Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius, DRC;  




11 Throughout the rest of this section, the name of a country is used to indicate the series of the bilateral 
real exchange rate between that country and the anchor country. cointegrating vector for this sub-group is generally robust and does not depend on the 
specifications of the test. Moreover, when Ethiopia (the fifth largest country in 
COMESA) is added, results are almost identical to those reported in the table. Finally, 
within the sub-groups based on per-capita income levels, cointegration is detected 
only for poorer countries. 
As already noted, for the full COMESA group some adjustments have to be made 
to limit the number of endogenous variables. The group with Egypt as anchor includes 
11 I(1) series. But one of them (Swaziland) is in fact barely stationary. It can therefore 
be dropped. The test suggests that there is cointegration and that actually more than 
one cointegrating vector can be identified. For the group with Kenya as anchor there 
are 13 endogenous variables. Eight of them are also I(1) series with the other two 
anchors. Therefore, a core group is formed with these eight series. The test shows that 
among them there is more than one cointegrating vector. The remaining five I(1) 
series are then added one at the time to the core group and the test is re-run. However, 
results are largely unaffected, with the only difference being represented by a change 
in the estimated number cointegrating vectors. Finally, the group with Zimbabwe as 
anchor has exactly 10 endogenous variables and hence no adjustment is needed. 
Again, the test suggests that there is cointegration among the RERs.  
   
4.3  Discussion 
 
The analysis in this section provides mixed evidence on the optimality of 
COMESA as a currency area. Following a typical pattern in Africa, intra-regional 
trade in COMESA is low. Two factors contributing to such a pattern are the small 
economic size and low incomes of most economies in the region and the persistence 
of barriers to trade. Low trade integration reduces the degree of interdependence of 
economies and hence increases the likelihood of shock asymmetries. This in turn can 
increase the costs of adopting a common currency.  
A more optimistic picture emerges from the implementation of the G-PPP test. 
The fundamentals of the four largest economies in the region (Kenya, Egypt, 
Zimbabwe and Sudan) appear to share a common stochastic trend. The result is 
confirmed, perhaps to a less robust extent, for the three regional sub-groups in which 
COMESA can be partitioned. The large number of countries in the region, and hence 
the large number of endogenous variables, limits the reliability of a test of 
cointegration for the full sample of COMESA. Yet, after adjusting the sample to 
account for that problem, evidence is obtained which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that shocks in the region are somehow convergent. 
That economic fundamentals tend to co-move while countries do not trade much 
between each other is consistent with the high degree of similarity of industry 
structures in the region. In COMESA, agriculture on average accounts for 44% of 
value added GDP, services for 25% and industry for 22% (with an 11% component of 
manufacturing). Such shares have remained fairly stable over the past two decades 
Moreover, data are characterised by a low dispersions: the average figures for the 
region as a whole in fact match quite closely country-specific figures in the majority 
of member states. The implication is that many of the countries tend to produce, and 
hence sell, the same commodities, with heavy reliance on primary products. 
Therefore, on one hand they lack the complementarity required to generate large trade 
volumes. On the other hand, they tend to experience similar shocks (i.e. changes in 
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 international commodity prices) and hence their business cycles exhibit synchronized 
fluctuations. 
Then the question remains of whether COMESA is an optimal currency area. As 
suggested by recent theoretical and empirical work (Frankel and Rose, 1998 and 
Corsetti and Pesenti, 2002), trade flows are likely to be endogenous to the process of 
monetary integration. That is, the process of policy harmonization and the transition 
towards a currency union should stimulate greater trade flows through its impact on 
macroeconomic stability, market size and microeconomic efficiency. In this sense, the 
currency area would be self-validating even though at the beginning of the process not 
all of the requisites for optimality indicated by the traditional theory (such as large 
trade flows between perspective members) were in place. Yet, in the case of 
COMESA, many countries need to complete structural adjustment. Moreover, 
regional economic institutions must be carefully designed and agreed upon by al 
members before they become operational. All this suggests that the transition to a 
currency union should be gradual (see also ECA, 2004). 
 
5. Income  convergence 
 
Regional economic integration is expected to strengthen trade links and hence to 
facilitate technological spillovers across borders. To the extent that this effectively 
happens, income levels should converge and the initially poorer member states will 
catch up with the richer ones. Strong evidence of convergence does exist for the 
European Union. Still, the same type of evidence is hardly available for other RECs. 
It has been suggested that income convergence is the likely outcome only in North-
North (or at most North-South) integration. On the contrary, South-South integration 
could easily lead to income divergence and unequal distribution of welfare gains (see 
for instance Venables 2002). 
This section analyses the extent of per-capita GDP convergence/divergence in 
COMESA. Following the literature in the field, two measures of convergence are 
computed. The first one (sigma convergence) is the standard deviation of per-capita 
real GDP across member states. The second one (beta convergence) is the estimated 
coefficient on initial (or lagged) per-capita GDP in a regression of the rate of per-
capita GDP growth. Results are reported in Table 6. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The top part of the table displays average standard deviation of per-capita GDP 
levels in five sub-periods and for different groups of countries. For the whole of 
COMESA there is no evidence of convergence. On the contrary, income dispersion 
appears to increase over time. The same is true for other clusters, even though in the 
North sub-group the rate of increase of the standard deviation is quite moderate. The 
group of higher income countries includes the ten member states whose per-capita 
income at the beginning of the sample period was above the regional median. The 
group of lower income countries instead includes the member states with income 
below the median. Incidentally, the composition of these two groups would be almost 
the same if income in 2000s (rather than in early ‘60s) were taken as reference. The 
only change would be that one country would move up from lower to higher income 
(Kenya) and one down from higher to lower income (Angola). Whilst there is no 
evidence of convergence among higher income countries, disparities are on a 
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 decreasing trend in the lower income group. But this is certainly not good news. In 
fact, convergence appears to be taking place to the bottom. Average income of this 
group has been constantly decreasing since mid-70s and the gap with the rest of 
COMESA is widening. Such patterns are consistent with (albeit do not necessarily 
prove) the hypothesis that some COMESA member states are trapped into poverty.  
The lower part of the table reports the estimate of the coefficient 1 in the 
following growth regression: 
 
(4)        it it it y g         it 2W β 1 1 0
 
where g is the annual growth rate of per-capita GDP in country i in period t, y is the 
log of per-capita GDP level in period t-1 (that is, at the beginning of period t), W is a 
vector of controls,  is a non-spherical disturbance and s are parameters to be 
estimated. The equation is estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). The set of controls includes: lagged values of primary and 
secondary enrolment rate, an index of political instability, the trade to GDP ratio, 
infrastructures (roads, railways, ports, telephone lines) density by surface and 
population. Estimates of 1 are qualitatively unaffected by inclusion of the rate of 
physical capital accumulation and are also robust to experimentation with the set of 
controls. 
The estimated coefficient on lagged per-capita income does not ever pass a zero 
restriction test. This means, that there is no significant evidence of relative 
convergence (or even divergence). As a point of comparison, consider that the same 
regression estimated for the European Monetary Union over the period 1960-2000 
yields a coefficient of beta convergence of –0.0153 with a p-value of 0.02. For other 
African RECs instead, results are pretty similar to that observed for COMESA, with 
the exception of UEMOA where the coefficient 1 is negative (-0.033) and different 
from zero at 10% confidence level in the period 1980-2000. 
To sum up, income does not appear to converge across COMESA member states. 
On the contrary, the gap between poorer and richer countries in the region is widening 
and overall distribution is probably evolving towards a bi-modal configuration. Thus, 
the experience of COMESA so far conforms to the general pattern observed in several 




A few results from the analysis in the previous sections can be highlighted.  
 Some macroeconomic variables do display a tendency to converge across 
countries. However the general picture, especially for what concerns the fiscal 
stance, is still characterised by substantial divergence.  
 Intra-regional trade flows are relatively low, even though on average higher than 
what a standard gravity model would predict.  
 The economic fundamentals of a bulk of countries in the region tend to share a 
common stochastic trend and hence there is evidence that shocks might be 
symmetric.  
 Sharp disparities in the distribution of income across countries persist, with a 
widening gap between richer and poorer member states. 
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 A few policy implications then emerge. Cross-country differences in the level of 
macroeconomic variables certainly reflect the competence of different governments in 
managing economic policy and reforms. But they are also likely to reflect different 
preferences over macroeconomic outcomes; that is, different targets on the output-
inflation trade-off as well as different views on the role of monetary and fiscal policy. 
Preferences across member states can differ for a number of reasons, including the 
ideological orientation of the government and the socio-political background of the 
country. In any case, the very existence of these differences, eventually coupled with 
asynchronised business cycles, can generate tensions that can lead to the collapse of 
the entire process of integration. Whilst convergence criteria are embedded in the 
policy harmonization program as a tool to facilitate the development of a common 
policy stance, even greater attention in the transition to a currency union ought to be 
dedicated to the design of institutions. These include the mechanisms to ensure 
effective decision making of the common monetary authority as well as its 
independence and autonomy, the definition of surveillance procedures for banking 
and credit sectors, the identification of a lender-of-last-resort (which should be the 
common central bank), the development of common formats for data-collection and 
analysis.   
At the same time, countries should strengthen efforts to remove barriers to intra-
regional trade. In fact, as already noted, trade integration reduces divergences and 
hence facilitates the adoption of a common policy stance. The elimination of tariffs 
and the realization of a free trade area is only one of several initiatives that should be 
undertaken. To promote trade, countries need to harmonize rules and regulations, 
establish a system of regional payments, co-operate on the realization of 
infrastructures to increase physical connectivity, speed up custom procedures, develop 
regional markets, and strengthen the flow of information across borders. Corollary 
initiatives pertain to the mobility of labour across borders and the harmonization of 
education systems. Most of these are in fact already mentioned in the treaties and 
protocols signed by member states. However, as reported in ECA (2004), progress on 
paper often is not matched by effective implementation. 
In the progress towards deep forms of integration, COMESA will face the critical 
issue of how to finance the process of integration itself. There are two relevant 
dimensions here. The first concerns the mobilization of resources to cover the budget 
of the secretariat and of other regional agencies. The second dimension is instead 
related to the establishment of a regional system of fiscal transfers to compensate 
income disparities and facilitate the development of less favoured areas in the region. 
In principle, regional institutions and projects should be self-financed. This is a 
widely accepted idea explicitly recalled in the COMESA Treaty (Article 168). 
However, the poor economic conditions of many member states clearly limit the 
extent of contributions from national budget, thus calling for the identification of 
alternative mechanisms. A possible solution is to set a levy based on imports of 
member states of goods originating from third countries (see, for instance, ECA 1997 
and 1998). The exact rate should be computed from projections of import values and 
spending needs. A preliminary estimate elaborated by the Economic Commission for 
Africa is that for COMESA a rate of 0.7% should generate a sufficient flow of 
resources. This mechanism would also smooth the possible conflicts over the 
allocation of regional funds that arise when these are paid from national budgets. The 
experience from other RECs where this levy is already effective (UEMOA, CEMAC, 
ECOWAS) is that customs administrations should be in charge of its implementation 
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 (that is computation of the tax-base and collection of funds). Funds should then be 
deposited directly in accounts at Central Banks and opened in the name of the 
Secretariat. Such funds should be fully available to the community (as it is the case in 
the European Union). Monitoring and surveillance procedures ought to be handed to 
the Executive Secretary of COMESA and to the regional policy organs. 
 
Finally it is worth pointing to some directions of future research. On the 
institutional side, given the prominence attributed to regional integration in Africa, it 
would be interesting to study the effectiveness and efficiency of the relationships 
between RECs and their link with the Africa Union. This involves, for instance, the 
issue of overlapping membership; that is, of countries that join more than one REC at 
the time and hence benefit from an escape clause which reduces their commitment to 
the process of integration in each region. On a political-economic ground, it is 
necessary to understand the factors that determine the speed of integration. There is 
little question that some RECs tend to integrate faster than others and that even within 
the same REC, some countries appear to be more committed than others. A potential 
driving force behind those differences is the way in which costs and benefits of 
integration are allocated across socio-economic groups, or at least the perception that 
groups have of the economic consequences of integration. A theoretical and empirical 
assessment of such forces would help assess the popular and political support that the 
process is likely to receive in the long-run. On a stricter economic ground, the 
question of how to achieve fiscal stabilisation is particularly relevant for COMESA 
and hence it will be important to evaluate whether the composition of fiscal 
adjustment has any impact in terms of duration and macroeconomic consequences of 
the adjustment itself. This would in turn create the basis for a critical assessment of 
the soundness of the fiscal convergence criteria currently imposed.     
 
 15 
 Appendix 1. Description of the data-set. 
 
Sources and variables 
 
The data-set used for this analysis consists of quarterly and annual observations on a 
number of macroeconomic variables. The sample period is generally set to 1970-
2002, with occasional extensions to 1965 for some variables.  Exceptions include 
Eritrea (data generally start in 1993/1994), Namibia (data start in 1990) and DRC 
(data end in 1998). Different sources have been used in the compilation of the data 
set. However, series from different sources have been combined only after checking 
for the consistency of definitions and the correspondence of the values reported for 
overlapping countries/periods. As detailed below, the main sources of raw data are: 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Development Indicators (WDI), World 
Bank Africa Database (WBADB), African Development Banks Selected Statistics 
(ADB). Variables definition is as follows. 
 
GNI per capita  Gross national income per-capita at PPP in US dollars. 
Source: ADB and WDI 
 
Aggregate real GDP  GDP at constant prices in local currency and USD. Base 
year is 1995. Source: WBADB and WDI 
 
Real GDP per-capita 
 
GDP per-capita at 1995 prices expressed in USD and local 
currency. Source: WBADB and WDI. 
 
Life expectancy  Number of years that a newborn is expected to live. 
Source: WDI 
 
Child mortality  Number of children who die before reaching age 5 (per 
1000 newborns). Source: WDI 
 
Inflation Annual/quarterly rate of change of CPI. Source: IFS, 
WBADB 
 
Fiscal balance  Overall budget balance of central governments. Budget 
balance includes current and capital revenues net of grants 
less total expenditure minus repayments. It is expressed in 
percent of GDP Source: WBADB, WDI 
 
CB financing  Central bank financing of budget expressed in percent of 
previous years’ tax revenues. CB financing is defined as 
line 12 AZF of IFS. Source: IFS and WBADB 
 
Claims on government  Total claims on central government in percent of GDP. 
Total claims on government is defined as line 32 AN of 
IFS. Source: IFS, WBADB. 
 
Money growth  Annual/quarterly percent change in money stock (lines 34 
ZF and 35 ZF of IFS). Source: IFS and WBADB 
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Domestic credit  Domestic credit to the private sector in percent of GDP. 
Source: IFS and WBADB. 
 
Debt service  Total domestic and external debt service in percent of 
exports. Source: WDI and WBADB. 
 
Tax revenues  Total tax revenues in percent of GDP. Source: WDI and 
WBADB. 
 
Intra regional trade  Total trade (imports plus exports) of a country with the 
other member states. It is expressed in percent of GDP, of 
total trade with African countries, and of total international 
trade. Source: Direction of Trade Statistics  
 
Real exchange rates 
 
Period average of real exchange rate between anchor 
country i and generic member state j. Anchor countries are 
Egypt, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Quarterly frequency of 




t ij t ij P
P
e RER , ,   
where e is the nominal exchange rate between i and j, P 
denotes the consumer price index and t is a generic 
quarter. Source: IFS. 
 
Regional aggregates and membership 
 
Membership of the regional communities and regional aggregates used in the paper 
are as follows. 
 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa): Angola, Burundi, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community): Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon. 
 
EAC (East African Community): Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. 
 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
 
SADC (Southern African Development Community): Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Leshoto, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union): Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. 
 
EU (European Union): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. 
 
EMU (European Monetary Union): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
 
MERCOSUR (Common Market of the South America): Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay. 
 
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Lao’s people Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. 
 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
 
MIDDLE EAST: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
 
SOUTH AMERICA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
EAST ASIA: Cambodia, China, SAR Hong Kong, Indonesia, Lao’s People 
Democratic Republic, Malysia, Macao, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand, Vietnam. 
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 Appendix 2. Tables 
 












Life expectancy  Child Mortality 




1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 
Angola 240  -2.8  5.73  45.46  46.58  131  207.8 
Burundi 110  -1.27  -0.78  43.59  41.96  180  175.8 
Comoros 380  0.35  0.97  55.97  60.97  120  80 
DRC 100  -7.03  -1.2  51.55  45.75  155  162.53 
Djibouti  840  -1.78  -0.1  47.77 45.81 175.1  178.04 
Egypt 1490  3.79  5.44  62.80  67.46  85  52.15 
Eritrea  170  3.40  2.23  48.94 52.03 139.6  102.92 
Ethiopia 100  2.6  5.28  45  42.29  213.4  178.92 
Kenya 360  2.04  1.78  57.11  46.97  97  119.8 
Madagascar 260  0.29  3.85  52.76  54.66  170  143.9 
Malawi 170  3.88  4.03  44.61  38.8  234  193.04 
Mauritius 3800  5.31  5.76  69.64  71.67  25  20.12 
Namibia 2050  4.55  3.84  57.52  47.15  84  112.08 
Rwanda 230  -3.85  9.92  40.19  39.94  202  202.9 
Seychelles 7310 3.95 2.32  70.3  72.34  21  13.98 
Sudan 320  7.33  6.66  52.17  56.17  125  81.2 
Swaziland 1290  3.75  3.42  56.64  45.62  115  119.46 
Uganda 310  4.58  5.61  46.75  42.13  165  161 
Zambia 300  -1.11  2.70  49,15  37.97  194  186.46 
Zimbabwe 480 2.33  2.07  56.16  39.93  77  115.84 
COMESA  477 2.87  4.71  51.99  49.61  147.11  134.93 
CEMAC  589 0.08  4.28  50.95  49.13  153.03  155.59 
ECOWAS  308 2.85  3.27  48.86  47.52  163.19  162.67 
SADC  891  0.88  2.63  52.5  44.67 146.03 146.1 
UEMOA  374  1.86  4.30  47.67 46.73 208.5  188.21 
AFRICA  650 1.98  3.71  52.55  50.22  144.21  135.18 
Ind. Countries  28316 1.98 3.04  76.28  78.15  9.16  7.01 
S. America  2946  5.71  4.12  64.34 68.43 72.27 44.04 
Mid. East  3634  3.32  2.11  67.34 69.21 50.45 33.51 
East Asia  1229 8.82 6.66  67.7  69.7  39.07  30.48 
Notes: Own computations from data-base described in the Appendix. Regional averages are computed 
as weighted averages of national data, using shares of population and shares of GDP as weights. 1990s 
denotes year 1990 or nearby, depending on availability. 2000s denotes the latest possible observation 
(2001 or 2002 for most countries). 
 Table 2 Convergence of macroeconomic variables 








Inflation              
(annual %   80-84 15.36  16.20  3.63  56.20  13.46  41.17 
Change  85-89 23.15  23.91  1.42  155.25  40.46  58.82 
Of CPI)  90-94 25.47  24.54  2.46  112.19  35.71  50.00 
  95-99 15.33  12.79  1.63  56.19  18.67  44.44 
  00-02 13.75 9.00  -1.97  89.03  22.91  47.06 
Fiscal              
Balance  80-84 -5.87  -6.72  -19.15  7.01  7.93  64.70 
(% of   85-89 -8.49  -10.04  -24.00  -0.29  6.96  44.44 
GDP)  90-94 -10.07  -9.03  -29.48  -0.87  9.41  35.00 
  95-99 -9.27  -4.70  -39.10  -0.07  9.84  70.00 
  00-02 -7.42  -5.01  -67.61  -0.93  7.40  47.36 
CB               
Financing  80-84 7.00 6.40  0.28  34.97  9.83  46.67 
(% of 0.2  85-89 6.03 7.47  0.00  31.00  9.33  75.00 
Tax rev.)  90-94 7.58 8.97  0.04  58.85  12.79  76.47 
  95-99 5.39 5.18  0.02  31.99  7.76  61.11 
  00-02 3.30 4.94  0.00  27.32  4.21  55.56 
Claims              
On gov  80-84 18.65  17.12  -6.24  49.46  34.07  62.50 
(% of  85-89 16.84  15.58  -7.49  46.40  32.45  52.94 
GDP)  90-94 17.38  24.68  -17.51  81.92  30.95  66.67 
  95-99 13.04  19.38  -16.47  68.76  17.60  68.42 
  00-02 11.77  22.37  -18.81  102.59  19.34  77.78 
Money              
Growth  80-84 18.27  18.63  7.20  56.61  24.45  33.33 
(Annual %  85-89 27.83  31.76  8.42  128.3  26.03  50.00 
Change)  90-94 26.96  27.33  1.38  85.32  26.85  47.05 
  95-99 18.48  17.10  -2.93  45.93  15.68  41.17 
  00-02 23.51  33.18  4.33  129.7  20.70  68.75 
Dom              
Credit  80-84 16.57  21.15  2.23  29.74  8.67  18.75 
(% of  85-89 17.38  24.68  2.20  55.31  12.82  52.94 
GDP)  90-94 19.51  23.48  1.15  46.80  13.37  38.89 
  95-99 21.40  34.00  1.06  51.81  17.11  52.63 
  00-02 22.16  40.14  2.08  61.36  18.13  55.56 
Debt              
Service  80-84 17.91  10.54  2.05  32.03  19.54  70.58 
(% of  85-89 23.99  15.22  5.04  49.12  25.00  52.94 
Exports)  90-94 19.17  15.71  3.23  59.54  19.62  66.67 
  95-99 15.96  18.14  0.66  54.70  15.11  60.00 
  00-02 14.41  12.63  1.53  35.82  12.25  65.00 
Tax              
Rev.  80-84 20.24  27.39  5.64  42.70  9.88  25.00 
(% of   85-89 21.78  26.14  4.10  47.03  10.61  22.22 
GDP)  90-94 21.52  25.91  4.83  48.40  11.65  30.00 
  95-99 22.39  24.31  5.31  45.19  11.17  35.00 
  00-02 22.49  21.35  9.80  41.83  9.68  15.79 
Notes: Own computations from data-base described in the Appendix. Shares of GDP used as weights in 
the computation of weighted regional averages. Data on inflation and money growth exclude the two 
war-torn countries with hyperinflation (DRC and Angola). Data on CB financing exclude DRC. 
Standard deviation (Std. Dev.) measures the average dispersion of each variable across countries in a 
given period. Tails indicate the percent of countries in the sample falling outside the range of  50% of 
the weighted mean. 
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 Table 3 Time series analysis of inflation and money growth 
  Inflation 
 
Money growth rates 
Burundi  8.775  S  14.708 
DRC  No convergence  No convergence 
Egypt  No convergence  18.994 
Ethiopia  No convergence  12.886 
Kenya  2.261   S  16.069   S 
Madagascar  No convergence  No convergence 
Malawi  No convergence  No convergence 
Mauritius  No convergence  No convergence 
Rwanda  3.408   S  20.083   S 
Seychelles  No convergence  13.821 
Sudan  9.227   S  No convergence 
Swaziland  No convergence  17.017 
Uganda  No convergence  No convergence 
Zambia  No convergence  No convergence 
Zimbabwe  No convergence  No convergence 
Notes: Own computations from data-set described in the Appendix. No convergence means that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at usual confidence levels. Critical values for the test of significance 
are drawn from Monte-Carlo simulations (Dickey and Fuller, 1979 and 1981, and Perron, 1990). S 
denotes that the coefficients on the dummy in model (2) are significant. Sample period is generally set 
from Q1/1970 to Q4/2002. 
 
Table 4 Trade statistics 
  Column 1 
(% of GDP) 
Column 2 
(% Int.-Afr. Trade) 
Column 3 
(% of total trade) 
Gap from predicted flows 
  ‘80-‘90 ‘91-‘01 ’80-‘90 ’91-‘01 ’80-‘90 ’91-‘01 1980  1990  2001 
Angola  0.107 0.179  22.607  7.234 0.218 0.191 0.065 -0.002  -0.132 
Burundi  2.518  3.104 84.940  68.498 9.422 11.210 2.285  1.648  3.203 
Comoros  3.500  3.179 92.996  43.535 6.708  6.944  n.  n.  n. 
DRC  0.349 1.139  26.580  18.192  1.549 3.065 0.044 1.223 0.173 
Dijbouti  8.354  12.953 69.564 57.616 12.476 11.878  n.  n.  n. 
Egypt  0.334 0.250  67.415  38.045  0.903 0.975 0.095 0.183 -0.523 
Ethiopia  0.739 1.632  97.322  92.449  3.581 6.604 0.762 0.932 1.470 
Kenya  4.068  5.452  84.758 55.990 10.067 10.671  4.865  4.613  6.011 
Madagascar  0.292 1.062  55.988  39.023  1.113 3.587 0.151 0.499 2.902 
Malawi  4.490  7.187 26.808  27.947 8.990 12.394 3.828  5.357 10.469 
Mauritius  1.648 2.877  23.021  27.408  1.855 3.030 2.786 1.950 2.796 
Rwanda  3.758  3.538  93.438 66.980 15.526 14.965  7.381  1.321  3.383 
Seychelles  3.326 2.025  32.311  22.128  4.725 2.942 3.214 1.094 0.377 
Sudan  0.687 0.934  82.795  37.257  4.558 4.330 0.099 0.107 -4.281 
Uganda  4.110  5.201  92.311 86.191 17.237 24.072  5.366  4.696  6.074 
Zambia  3.124  5.446 34.942  31.887 5.869 10.652 1.704  5.145  5.084 
Zimbabwe  2.190 3.588  21.653  17.208  6.528 6.318 2.377 3.330 3.419 
COMESA  2.564 3.514  59.379  43.388  6.549 7.872 2.335 2.140 2.695 
 
Memorandum items 
CEMAC  2.824  3.069 47.736  43,063 6.354  5.039  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
EAC  3.052  4.193  76.414 60.046 10.450 13.611  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
ECOWAS  4.953  8.024  79.192 80.053 11.622 14.199  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
SADC  5.881  11.091 71.408 81.408 12.142 20.203  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
UEMOA  4.137  5.317  56.956 53.426 10.816 10.730  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
EU-15  29.011 36.652  N.A.  N.A.  57.261 62.614  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
MERCOSUR  5,614  10.721 N.A.  N.A. 25.489  39,363 N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
ASEAN  17.359 27.378  N.A.  N.A.  19.051 25.423  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Notes: Own computations from data-set described in the Appendix. N.A. stands for Not Applicable, n. 
stands for not available. Data for Eritrea, Namibia and Swaziland are not available. Trade of each 
country with the other COMESA member states is expressed in percent of intra-regional trade (Column 
1), intra-African trade (column 2) and total international trade (Column 3). Column 4 reports the 
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 difference between actual trade flows and predicted trade flows from gravity models (see text) and it is 
expressed in percent of GDP. 
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 Table 5 Cointegration test of Real exchange rates 
  L. R. 
T-stat. 
Critical values  N. of 
coint. 
vectors 
   5% 1%   
Sub groups by geographical location 
 
     
Northern group  (Egypt anchor) 
 
19.63 18.17  23.46  2 
Central group  (Kenya anchor) 
 
110.25 94.15  103.18  1 
Southern group (Zimbabwe anchor) 
 
35.02 29.68  35.65  1 
Sub groups by economic size (aggregate 
GDP) 
     
Large countries (Egypt anchor) 
 
57.60 47.21  54.46  1 
Large countries (Kenya anchor) 
 
57.21 47.21  54.46  1 
Large countries  (Zimbabwe anchor) 
 
54.27 47.21  54.46  1 
Sub groups by p.c. income levels 
 
     
Higher income (Egypt anchor) 
 
28.85 47.21  54.46  NONE 
Lower income (Kenya anchor) 
 
150.23 124.24  133.57  1 
Higher income (Zimbabwe anchor) 
 
27.77 47.21  54.46  NONE 
Full COMESA group 
 
     
Group 1 (Egypt anchor) 
 
338.08 233.13  247.18  3 
Group 2 (Kenya anchor)
a 
 
225.30 156.00  168.36  3 
Group 3 (Zimbabwe anchor) 
 
306.00 233.13  247.18  2 
Source: Own computations from data-set described in the Appendix. Sample period is Q1/1980-
Q4/2002 The composition of groups is as follows. Northern group: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan. Central 
group: Kenya, Burundi, DRC, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda. Southern group: Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Swaziland, Madagascar. Large countries: Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, (Ethiopia). Higher 
income countries: Egypt, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zimbabwe. Lower income countries: 
Kenya, DRC, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda. COMESA group 1: Egypt, 
Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Zimbabwe. 
COMESA group 2: Zimbabwe, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda. COMESA group 3: Kenya, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Zimbabwe. 
a  The following countries are added, one at the time, to the basic group indicated above: DRC, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland, Uganda. Results when including such countries (available from the 




 Table 6 Test of income convergence 
  
  Sigma convergence 
  1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-02 
COMESA  716.72 991.30  1181.64  1626.89  1735.96 
Large countries  140.43 203.75 288.34 362.12 425.30 
North  n.a. n.a.  452.66  460.7  475.45 
Central  n.a. n.a.  1773.8  2600.04  2769.64 
South  n.a. n.a.  763.80  754.21  840.52 
Higher income  n.a. 1251.09  1459.36  2057.30  2193.40 
Lower income  n.a.  192.66 178.53 134.91 139.40 
       
  Beta convergence 
  1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-02 1960-02 
Coefficient  -0.26 -0.46 0.33  0.45 -0.17 
Standard error  0.41 5.38 0.56 0.67 0.50 
T-ratio  -0.62 -0.85 0.59  0.68 -0.34 
p-value  0.54 0.41 0.56 0.51 0.74 
Source: Own computations from data-set described in the appendix. Sigma convergence data are period 
average of regional standard deviation of per-capita GDP. Beta convergence data are estimated 
coefficients of initial per-capita GDP in a panel growth regression (see text for details). Groups are as 
follows. COMESA: all member states. Large countries: Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, (Ethiopia). 
North: Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea. Central: Kenya, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seycelles, Tanzania, Uganda. South: Zimbabwe, Angola, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Zambia. Higher icome: Comoros, Sudan, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Angola. Lower income countries: Kenya, Burudi, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia, Uganda. 
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